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  This paper deals with costs-benefit analysis of investment in transport 
infrastructure. Its contribution is twofold. Firstly, we develop a general equilibrium 
model to explore the impact of a small budgetary-neutral investment in transport 
infrastructure in a second-best setting, where other markets in the economy are 
distorted by taxes or external costs.  The model incorporates different transport modes 
that are used both for intermediate inputs (freight) and for final consumption 
(passenger travel). An intuitive operational expression for the net economic benefit of 
an investment is derived that depends on the way the investment is financed. This 
expression generalizes recent findings in the literature. Secondly, we illustrate the 
results numerically using a small example. Our findings show that both the specific 
financing instrument used and the labour market consequences may have large 
implications for the net benefits of transport investments. Significant errors may be 
made in limiting cost-benefit analysis to transport markets only. 
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  The traditional assessment of transport investments largely focuses on their 
direct costs and benefits on transport markets (Layard and Glaister (1994), Pearce and 
Nash (1984)). Of course, it is well known from welfare theory that this is only 
acceptable under rather heroic assumptions with respect to the social welfare function 
one assumes and regarding the functioning of other markets. Specifically, it requires 
that the government has perfect instruments available to redistribute income in 
combination with the total absence of distortions in all markets other than transport 
markets. None of these assumptions is realistic, so there is a need to adapt traditional 
cost-benefit rules to correct for distortions elsewhere in the economy and for 
distributive concerns.  
  The purpose of this paper is to embed cost-benefit analysis in a general 
equilibrium framework that takes into account distortions on all markets, as well as 
the distributional effects of both the infrastructure improvement and of the way it is 
financed. Specifically, we develop a general equilibrium model to explore the impact 
of a small budgetary-neutral investment in transport infrastructure in a second-best 
setting, where other markets in the economy are distorted by taxes or external costs.  
The model incorporates different transport modes that are used both for intermediate 
inputs (freight) and for final consumption (passenger travel). We first derive a very 
general but quite intuitive operational expression for the net economic benefit of an 
investment that takes into account the way the investment is financed. Next we 
illustrate the application of the methodology with a few numerical examples.  
  Although substantial progress has been made recently on incorporating effects 
within the transport sector in cost-benefit analysis (e.g., effects of a road investment 
elsewhere on a road network (Kidokoro (2004)), there is still a need to incorporate 
general equilibrium effects for at least three reasons
1. First, it provides better and 
                                                 
1  Importantly, there are at least two common misunderstandings related to the role of general 
equilibrium corrections in cost-benefit analysis. One is that only large transport projects need a general 
equilibrium correction. This is not correct. Any project, even a very small one, will have effects on the 
rest of the economy; these effects can proportionally be as important as in the case of large projects. 
Hence, in percentage terms, the ‘mistake’ made by ignoring general equilibrium effects does not 
depend on project size. Another misunderstanding is that macro-economic models can do the general 
equilibrium corrections ex post. Again, this is not true. Macro models can be helpful to trace the 
ultimate effects of certain measures on economic activity and on the public budget. They are not suited 
for welfare analysis of projects, however, because they only track aggregate macro-indicators (like 
GDP, inflation) and neither individual nor social welfare.  
  1more complete estimates of the implications of a transport infrastructure improvement 
by taking into account the feedback effects on other sectors. For example, an 
investment in inland waterways may stimulate freight-intensive economic activities. 
Second, it can assess the indirect efficiency
2 effects on other markets by computing 
the increase (or decrease) in the distortions on these markets. Distortions can take 
many different forms. They include the presence of indirect taxes or subsidies, 
imperfections due to oligopolistic market structures (e.g., car markets, airlines) or 
standard cases of market disequilibrium due to, e.g., classical unemployment on the 
labor market. In evaluating the effect of the transport investment on these distortions 
one can distinguish between the direct effect on other distorted markets (suppose, for 
example, that the investment reduces commuting costs which stimulate employment) 
and the indirect effects on the tax system: the investment indirectly affects tax 
revenues and causes increased public deficits or surpluses. These latter effects are 
often ‘hidden’ in a cost of funds parameter. Third,  general equilibrium calculations of 
transport investment costs and benefits allows to estimate, in a rigorous way, the 
income distribution effects of a transport project; it takes into account not only the 
distributive consequences of the project itself but also  the effects of raising the funds 
(e.g., via taxes) that finance the infrastructure investments.  
  There are two possible approaches to the integration of general equilibrium 
effects. One can build a large scale general equilibrium model that explicitly 
incorporates all markets in the economy and, by definition, integrates all effects of the 
investment on all these markets
3. This ‘ideal’ approach often misses the necessary 
degree of detail for specific transport projects, however. We therefore choose another 
approach in this paper. We explicitly include only a limited number of important 
aggregate markets (transport markets, labor market, two types of commodity markets: 
freight-intensive and other
4) into the model, and we integrate financing aspects via 
shadow cost parameters that are derived within the framework of the model itself. 
This approach yields more intuitive and transparent results and, as we will argue, 
offers more chances for a decentralized implementation in practice.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
2 Efficiency on these other markets is increased when the effect of distortions between consumer prices 
(willingness to pay) and marginal costs is reduced. Note that efficiency disregards the distribution of 
losses and gains over individuals.  
3 Models have typically between 10 and 100 sectors, where the sectoral detail is determined by the 
available Input-Output matrix data. 
4 One implicitly invokes Hicks’ aggregation theorem here to limit the number of aggregate goods. 
  2   The theoretical approach developed in this paper mainly draws upon three 
strands of literature. First, since transport infrastructure can be seen as a congestible 
public good, the extensive literature on the cost of funding public goods via 
distortionary taxes is directly relevant. The question of the appropriate supply of 
public goods in an economy with distortionary labour taxes is a classic in the 
theoretical public finance literature since Pigou (more recently, see Atkinson and 
Stern (1974), King (1986) and Sandmo (1998)). When we ignore issues of income 
distribution, the message from this literature looks simple but, in the case of transport 
investment, it is not. The simple answer to the question of the optimal level of supply 
of public investment is that the extra efficiency cost of raising tax money via labor 
taxes increases the cost of public funds above one, calling for a smaller supply of the 
public good. However, in the case of transport investments this argument ignores the 
feedback effect of the investment on total tax revenues via the consumption of taxed 
commodities such as transport, freight-intensive consumer goods and labor (e.g., in 
the case of reduced commuting costs). Moreover, including equity concerns requires 
paying attention to the income of the beneficiaries of the investment and to the 
incomes of those ultimately paying for it. In parallel, a large literature has developed 
that estimates the marginal cost of public funds raised via different types of taxes, but 
without any feedback from the public expenditure to the tax base (Kleven and Kreiner 
(2006)). 
  A second strand of literature specifically deals with the role of distortions in 
the rest of the economy for transport pricing and investment projects. For example, 
Mayeres and Proost (1997) develop optimal tax and investment rules for congestion-
type externalities. Parry and Bento (2001) incorporate the relation between transport 
and labor markets to evaluate a tax reform on the transport market and show that the 
feedback effects of congestion imply more favorable labor market outcomes of a 
congestion tax increase. Two other tax reform exercises include Mayeres and Proost 
(2001) and Calthrop, De Borger, Proost (2007). The first study considers the 
distributive effects of a transport tax reform, the latter studies a partial tax reform on 
the transport market, in the sense that the reform implies higher taxes on freight but 
not on passengers.  
  Third, we extend the recent literature on cost-benefit analysis of transport 
investments and compare our theoretical results with recent applications to concrete 
transport infrastructure projects. At the theoretical level, Kanemoto and Mera (1985) 
  3and Jara Diaz (1986) offer first attempts to incorporate general equilibrium effects, 
but they largely focus on a first-best world, and they ignore congestion. More 
recently, Kidokoro (2004, 2006) generalizes earlier second-best analyses (see, e.g., 
Oppenheim (1995) and Williams et al. (2001)) by offering a consistent method for 
benefit estimation on transport networks. He shows that in a second-best world three 
methods are equivalent: calculate the benefits as (i) the changes in the sum of total 
consumer and producer surplus on all routes, (ii) the changes in the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus on the route where the investment takes place plus the change in 
deadweight losses
5 on all other routes, (iii) the benefits in the first-best case plus the 
changes in deadweight losses on all routes. However, he does not allow for 
distributive concerns, and does not explicitly take into account the relation with non-
transport markets, nor the issue of financing the investment. Finally, Fosgerau and 
Pilegaard (2007) study cost-benefit rules in a general equilibrium framework that does 
incorporate the relation with the labor market and financing by distortionary taxes. 
They express benefits in terms of variables that can be obtained as the predicted 
output of traffic models, such as changes in commuting time, changes in taxes or 
resource costs, changes in the number of commuters, etc. It captures secondary effects 
and financing issues by applying an exogenous marginal cost of funds, which ignores 
the impact of the specific financing instrument on congestion. A disadvantage of the 
model is that it does not guarantee that the exogenous changes taken from the 
transport model are consistent with the behavior underlying the general equilibrium 
model, nor does it allow feedbacks from the general equilibrium model to the traffic 
model.   
  Our model generalizes both Kidokoro (2004, 2006) and Fosgerau and Pilegard 
(2007); their results can be obtained as special cases of our model. We include 
distributive issues, we model the relation between the transport sector and the rest of 
the economy, and we model how the investment affects demands for transport and 
non-transport goods, congestion, etc. Moreover, we consider the marginal cost of 
funds of different financing instruments. 
  Our methodology is of direct policy relevance. We compare our findings with 
practical guides to cost-benefit analysis that are currently used by national public 
administrations and International Financing Institutions to inform policy decisions on 
                                                 
5 If the consumer price on these other routes differs from the marginal social cost due to existing taxes 
or tolls, the deadweight loss is the loss of consumer and producer surplus, net of tax or toll revenues.  
  4investment decisions (e.g. World Bank, 1998; European Commission, 2002; European 
Investment Bank and European Commission, 2005).  
  The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the 
structure of our model. Then, in Section 2, we derive the welfare effect of road and 
rail investments under different assumptions about how the investment is funded; 
specifically, we consider lump-sum
6, labor and transport taxes. We compare the 
structure of the welfare effects obtained with previous results in the literature and with 
the current advice on practical cost-benefit analysis included in several well known 
manuals of international organizations. In Section 3 we briefly review some 
implementation issues that arise when applying the models in practice, using available 
data and empirical information. A small-scale numerical example is presented in 
Section 4. The application illustrates various theoretical results and corroborates the 
relevance of incorporating general equilibrium effects in analyzing the welfare effects 
of transport investments. Finally, Section 5 summarizes conclusions.     
 
1. The structure of the model 
 
  In this section we describe the structure of the model. We discuss 
consecutively how we model consumer behavior, producer behavior, congestion, 
behavior of the government, and the structure of the welfare function. Note that we 
model a steady state economy. There are no transfers between periods, so no budget 
deficit is allowed. Moreover, infrastructure is treated as fully variable. Finally, 
capacity costs are interpreted as rental costs for one period. 
 
The consumer 
  We have N different individuals in our economy. These individuals are 
allowed to differ in their consumption pattern and in their productivity. We will 
further in the paper interpret differences in consumption pattern as differences in 
location and in consumption of freight-intensive goods. This implies that the model 
does capture the realistic case in which some individuals are directly affected by the 
transport investment; whereas others are not not.  
Let preferences for individual i be given by the utility function: 
           (1) 
1234 (,, ,, , , ) ii i i i i i i i Uu C D l T T T T =
                                                 
6 A lump sum tax is a tax that does not distort relative prices and has therefore no direct deadweight 
losses. It affects the economy via income effects only. A head tax is a good example of a lump sum tax.  
  5where variables are defined as follows: 
   : clean consumption good; numeraire  i C
   : dirty good  i D
   : leisure  i l
   : commuting by road 
1
i T
   : commuting via a non-congested mode (rail) 
2
i T
   : non-commuting transport by road 
3
i T




  The individual faces the following budget and time constraints: 
       (2)  12 3 4
1234
Di i i i i i i i TT T T qD C qT qT qT qT w e L G ++ + + + = +
   
13 1 24 2 () () ii i i i i L lTT TT L φφ ++ + + + =     (3) 
where  D q  and  j T q  (j=1,2,3,4) are consumer prices,   is the net of tax wage,  is an 
individual specific productivity index,
w i e
L is total available time,    is labour supply, 
 is a lump-sum transfer.  Finally, the 
i L
G
12 , φ φ are congestion functions for road and 
rail; they indicate the time needed to travel one kilometer. For rail, this can be taken 
as a constant as there is by definition no congestion. See below for more details.  
  Combining the time and budget restrictions, maximization of utility leads to 
the indirect utility function; this can be written as: 
  1234 ,,,,,, ii D i TTTT Vw e qPPPPGw e L ⎡⎤ + ⎣⎦  
where 

















are generalized prices per kilometer for the various transport services. They consist of 
the monetary price plus the time cost. The latter is the time needed to travel one 
kilometer times the value of time; in the above setup of the model, the value of time is 
just the effective wage per time unit. Note that extending the model to allow more 
flexible specifications of the value of time is conceptually straightforward, but it 
complicates some of the derivations and comes at a loss of transparency. For example, 
if the utility specification (1) also explicitly depends on the time spent in the different 
  6transport modes and periods, the value of time for an individual will also capture the 
disutility of the time losses in transport. However, the advantage of the approach 
taken in this section is that indirect utility is defined in terms of generalized prices that 
depend on exogenous time values. In section 2.6, we briefly consider implementation 
of the model based on time values taken from the empirical literature.         
 
Producer behavior 
  Production is described by the following expressions: 
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The first expression assumes linear production possibilities for some general multi-
purpose good; the second equation specifies the production function of the dirty good. 
The left-hand side of the first expression allocates the multi-purpose good to private 
transport (T), other consumption (C), freight transport (F) and intermediate inputs (X) 
needed for the production of the dirty consumption good, and to cover the rental costs 
of transport capacity (I). The weak inequality implies that production possibilities are 
limited by the total effective labour inputs supplied. Note that two types of investment 
in transport capacity are distinguished:
1 I  is road investment and 
2 I  is rail investment. 
The second equation captures the idea that the dirty good is produced under constant 
returns to scale, using two types of freight transport (  for road and rail, 
respectively), a clean intermediate input (
12 , FF
X ) and transport time (φ ). We assume the 
unit requirement of freight of type 1 and 2 per unit of the dirty good to be , 
hence
12 , ND ND FF
11 2 , ND ND
2 F DF F DF == . Note that cost minimizing behavior by producers 
implies that the unit requirements depend on prices and congestion levels. It also 
implies that the unit cost function, which we denote  , depends on the taxes or 




2 τ τ , respectively) and on unit trip time 
by both modes. So  12
12 (,, , D FF c ) τ τφ φ  
 
Congestion 
  The congestion function for roads and rail relates the trip time per unit to 
traffic levels and capacity of infrastructure. It is given by, respectively: 
  7   










      ( 4 )  
where    are the congestion functions. Transport variables reflect total 
demand across individuals: 
12 (.), (.) ff









As argued above, 
1 I  is road investment and 
2 I  is rail investment. Note that we 
assume travel times for rail to be independent of traffic levels for simplicity, but it 
does depend on investment in capacity. Rail therefore operates at constant speed for 
given infrastructure, independent of demand; in this sense it is un-congested. Further 
note that we assume the contribution of commuting, non-commuting and freight 
transport to congestion to be equal.  
 
The government 
  The government levies taxes on labour ( L τ ), passenger and freight transport 
(freight taxes  1 ,
FF
2 τ τ ; passenger taxes are denoted  j T τ , for j=1,….,4)) and the dirty 
good ( D τ ). It pays for two types of infrastructure investment, viz. in road and rail 
capacity (
12 , I I , respectively) and for the lump-sum transfer G. Its budget restriction 
reads: 
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  Welfare is captured by a standard social welfare function defined on 
individual utilities: 
             ( 6 )   12 ( , ,.... ) N WW V V V =
where indirect utilities have been defined before. We normalize all producer prices as 
well as the pre-tax wage per efficient unit of labor at one. Prices and wages are 
therefore defined as: 
      
12
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  8where  is the unit cost function for production of the dirty good. Indirect utility 
functions can therefore be rewritten as: 
(.) D c
 
  12 1234
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j
   (8) 
where 
            (9) 
1
2
(1 ) (1 ) , 1,3











  Finally, we define the marginal social utility of giving one extra unit of 
income to individual i as 











Because the welfare function and utility functions are only defined up to a constant 
positive linear transformation, we will later normalize the λ’s such that their average 
equals one. The λ parameters allow us to integrate the distributional preferences of the 
decision maker in a systematic way.  If one does not care about income distribution, 
all the  λ’s equal one and the distribution of benefits and costs is no longer important. 
The more one cares about the income distribution the larger will be the difference 
between the marginal social utilities of income. The distribution of the λ’s can either 
be based on ethical or normative principles, or it can be based on observed political 
choices.                     
 
 
2. The welfare effect of transport investment in general equilibrium 
 
  In this section, we consider the welfare effects of transport investments. More 
precisely, we look at the welfare effect of a small permanent increase  in the level 
of transport capacity i. We look at both road and rail investments, and we consider 
lump-sum transfers, labor taxes, and taxes on transport users (i.e., road charges) as 
possible financing instruments (see sections 2.1-2.4). We summarize our findings in 
section 2.5. Finally, in section 2.6 we provide a brief comparison of our results with 
the guidelines found in several manuals of international organizations on cost-benefit 
analysis of transport investments. 
i dI
 
  92.1 Welfare effect of investment in roads financed by reduction in transfer G 
  Consider the welfare change of a marginal and budgetary neutral investment 
in road capacity, where the investment is financed by reducing the transfer  . As the 
transfer is the same for everyone, this amounts to financing by a uniform lump sum 
tax. The welfare effect can be written as: 
G
   11
G
G
dW dW dW dG
dI dI dG dI
⎛⎞ =+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
1                      (10) 
The superscript on the left-hand side indicates that the investment is financed by the 
transfer  . The welfare effect consists of the direct welfare effect of the investment, 
independent of financing (holding the transfer G constant), plus the induced effects 
due to financing (i.e., via the changes in the transfer). Differentiating the welfare 
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Note that in (11a) the investment impact on congestion is measured at constant G . 
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i T T                            (12) 
It captures the welfare cost for individual i of an increase in the time needed to make a 
trip, i.e., an increase in
1 φ . More congestion raises the price of the dirty good via 
effects on freight input costs, and it affects passenger transport; this latter welfare cost 
is captured by the value of time (equal to the net wage) times transport demands of the 
congestible transport type (road). Substituting (11a)-(11b) into (10) gives, after 
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           (13) 
  
  10  On the right hand side of (13), the first term is the direct benefit of the 
investment. It represents the decrease in transport time costs and production costs, 
weighted by the marginal social utilities of income λi. The second term represents the 
full effect of the lump sum tax (reduction of transfer G) that is needed to pay for the 
investment.  
We assume the investment is budgetary neutral. To find out what increase in 




rewrite the government’s budget constraint (5) as: 
    123412
12 1 2 (,, , , , , , ,,,) LDTTTT FF RG τττ τ τ τ τ τ φφ N G I I = ++               (14) 
The left-hand side captures tax revenues: 
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The implicit function theorem applied to (14) then yields, after simple algebra: 
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  Next define the marginal cost of funds of the financing instrument . The 
marginal cost of funds of a given tax instrument is the welfare cost of using this 
instrument to raise one unit of extra government revenue. At this level no account is 
taken of the effects of spending the extra unit of revenue on public goods as the latter 
effect is measured separately.  The definition we use takes into account that the extra 
lump sum tax affects (be it marginally) the spending on transport related goods by 
consumers and firms and, therefore, congestion; this in turn affects consumption and 
government revenue. Note that these latter effects are probably trivial for the tax 
instrument  , but not for other financing instruments such as transport taxes that we 



































  11where  123412
12 1 2 Re ( , , , , , , , , , , ) LDTTTT FF vN GI I R G τ τττττττ φ φ =+ + − . Using the 
definition of  , see (12), we have:           i A
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Note that this marginal cost of funds can not be directly taken from the literature for 
two reasons: unlike estimates in the literature (Kleven and Kreiner (2006)), it applies 
to the tax instrument G, and it corrects for congestion effects.   
  Next use (16) and (17) in the expression for the welfare effects of investment 
(expression (13)) to find: 
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             (18) 
The first term captures the welfare-weighted benefit of the road investment for 
households (remember that the A terms contain freight transport benefits as well as 
passenger transport benefits). The second term deals with the financing aspects: it 
consists of the cost of the investment (here equal to 1) and the induced tax revenue 
changes, both measured at the marginal cost of funds. The tax revenue changes 
induced by the investment may be important if transport is a highly taxed good or if it 
facilitates commuting and increases labour supply. 
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  12where we have written aggregate demand derivatives wherever possible. 
  The final step is to note that, differentiating (4), the congestion reduction term 
satisfies: 
        
11 1 1 1 3 1 1
11 1 1 3 1 1 1
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               (20) 
The first component on the right hand side is the effect of the investment on travel 
time at given traffic levels: the investment reduces congestion for a given traffic flow. 
The other terms capture the effect of the investment on congestion via induced 
changes in the demand for passenger and freight road transport. Substituting (20) into 
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where  k MECC stands for the equity-weighted marginal external congestion cost of a 
given transport type k ( ). For example (similar for the other 
types):  
14 1 ,...., , , kT TF F =
2














∂ ∑  
Expression (21) finally shows that the welfare effect of a small road investment 
financed by a reduction in the transfer consists of six well-defined terms: 
-  The direct benefit of the investment, measured at constant traffic levels 
-  The direct cost of the investment measured at the marginal cost of public 
funds 
-  The benefits or costs of induced rail and road passenger traffic  
-  The benefits or costs  of  induced rail and road freight traffic 
  13-  The benefits of changes in demand for the dirty good due to lower unit 
cost    
-  The benefits of the extra labor tax revenues generated by the transport 
investment and the way it is financed.  
 
  To interpret (21), first note that it is well known that in a welfare analysis of a 
given price or capacity change on one market, the effects on the other markets need 
only to be considered to the extent they are distorted. The distortions take here the 
form of  a difference between a tax rate and the marginal external cost (that may be 
zero). All tax revenues are measured at the marginal cost of funds for a lump sum tax, 
as the lump sum tax is here the marginal tax used to balance the budget. Alternatively 
one can normalize all benefits and marginal external costs by the marginal cost of 
public funds. Second, note that benefits and the marginal external costs are equity-
weighted but the revenue terms are not. The reason is that all tax revenue effects are 
shared equally by all individuals via a head tax, while the congestion costs or benefits 
are not.  A third thing to note is that, with strict proportionality between commuting 
and labour supply, one can add the change in labour supply terms to the changes on 
the commuter transport market. The distortion on the commuter (or labour supply) 
market contains in this case the difference between the sum of the labour tax and the 
transport tax and the marginal external congestion cost.    
 
2.2. Welfare effect of a rail investment financed by a reduction in the transfer G  
  Consider now, largely by analogy, the welfare change due to investing an 
extra euro in rail capacity, financing the investment by reducing the transfer . We 
consider an investment that raises average rail speed for simplicity. In Appendix 1 we 
show that the welfare effect is given by: 
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The term  i B  is the welfare cost of time losses in rail transport. Note that rail 
investment 
2 I directly affects time used for a rail trip 
2 φ . It also indirectly affects 
time in road transport 
1 φ : the investment reduces generalized prices of rail, which 
(through cross-price effects) influence demand for road transport, hence affecting 
congestion 
1 φ .   In the case of road investment (see (21)), there was no such indirect 
effect because congestion levels in rail are kept constant. Comparing (22) with (21), 
the main difference is that rail investment affects road congestion, whereas (by our 
assumptions) road investment has no impact on rail speed.  
The first term on the right hand side of (22) is the direct weighted welfare 
benefit of lower rail travel times for consumers; the second term is the investment cost 
evaluated at the cost of funds. The other terms reflect, as before, the distortions on the 
various markets. Rail investment affects the demand for passenger and freight road 
transport, where the existing distortion is given by the deviation of tax (corrected for 
the cost of funds) and marginal external congestion cost. The investment further 
affects tax revenues on the markets for rail freight, the dirty good, and the labor 
market. 
  
2.3. Welfare effect of investment in roads financed by raising the tax on labor 
  Consider the welfare change due to investing an extra euro in road capacity, 
financing the investment by raising the labor tax. Using the methodology of the 
previous sections, we find that the welfare effect can be written as (see Appendix 2): 
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This is identical to (21), except for the use of a different marginal cost of funds. In 
expression (23), the marginal cost of raising a euro through the labor tax is given by 
































2.4. Welfare effect of investment in roads financed by a tax on road use 
  Assume the investment in roads needs to be fully financed through an increase 
in the tax on road use. As we have 2 taxes on road use (one on commuting transport 
and one on non-commuting transport), we can either increase both taxes in a uniform 
way, or focus on only one of them. In what follows, we select the tax  1 T τ on  to 
close the budget; this allows a direct comparison with the expressions obtained for 
financing via the lump sum subsidy or the labour tax.  
1 T
  Going through the same procedure as before, one finally obtains the welfare 
effect of a road investment financed by an increase in the road tax: 
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2.5. Welfare effect of investment in a general equilibrium model: summing up 
  For a given investment, whatever the source of funds, the expressions for the 
welfare assessment (21)-(24) all have the same structure. We always have three types 
of terms: 
  - the direct benefit of the investment keeping all traffic flows and all taxes 
  constant; this term is independent of the source of funding 
  - the direct cost of financing the investment, measured at the marginal cost of 
  funds of the tax instrument used;  
  - the induced distortions of the investment on all the markets, measured at 
  constant taxes. The distortion equals the difference between the tax, corrected 
  for the marginal cost of funds, minus the marginal external costs.  
Note that only the first element is independent of the source of funding. Moreover, the 
financing instrument used only enters the expressions via a different marginal cost of 
funds, but leaves all other terms unaffected.   
  One would expect that, if the externality is initially insufficiently taxed, an 
externality-correcting tax would generate additional benefits compared to using a 
labor or lump-sum tax as financing instrument. Considering expression (24), at first 
sight there seems to be no such extra benefit from using transport taxes as financing 
instrument. However, the additional benefits are present, but they are hidden in the 













−∑  in the marginal cost 
of funds of a transport tax will give extra credit to the externality reduction effect of a 
transport tax: the effect of this tax on congestion is more direct and likely to be 
numerically much more important when using a transport tax, compared to labor and 
lump-sum taxes.  
  One can relate the expressions for the net welfare gain (or loss) with earlier 
findings in the literature. First, consider the literature on the optimal supply of public 
goods. If one uses only one distorting tax to finance the investment (say the tax on 
labor), dividing through by the marginal cost of funds generates an expression that is 
comparable to Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1994) and Mayeres and Proost (1997): 
the benefits of the public good supply (the reduction of external costs) are all scaled 
down by the marginal cost of government revenue.  
  Second, with proper re-interpretation, our expressions also immediately 
produce simple results on tax reform. Consider the net welfare effect of raising one 
euro of tax revenue by increasing an arbitrary tax A, where the budget is kept constant 
by decreasing tax revenue by one Euro through a reduction in another tax B. 
Specifically; let us consider an increase of the transport tax  1 T τ financed by a reduction 
in the labor tax. In our model, this can be obtained by (i) subtracting the welfare 
expression for a given investment financed by the labor tax from the corresponding 
expression for transport tax financing, and (ii) noting that the operation implies that 
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This is just the difference in marginal cost of funds for the two taxes. It is also 
precisely the tax reform formula obtained by Mayeres and Proost (2001), although our 
expressions are more general because they also include taxes on intermediate goods.  
  Third, we can compare with the recent results on cost-benefit of transport 
projects, most notably obtained by Kidokoro (2004, 2006). He ignores freight 
transport as well as the markets for labor and the dirty consumption good. Moreover, 
  18he considers distortions on other routes within a transport network rather than 
distortions on markets for other transport modes, but this is just a semantic distinction 
between his and our model. Not surprisingly, our results reduce to those he obtained 
under some simplifying assumptions. For example, if distributive concerns are 
irrelevant and the marginal cost of funds equals one, if pricing on competing transport 
markets is at marginal external cost, then our model reproduces Kidokoro’s first-best 
case (see p. 283-284). The benefits are then given by the direct consumer surplus on 
the market where the investment took place plus the extra tax revenues on this market. 
If the competing transport mode is not optimally priced, our formulas reproduce 
(keeping all other assumptions) Kidokoro’s second expression (see p. 289) for the 
second-best case: the benefit is the consumer surplus on the market where investment 
took place plus that tax revenues on this market, plus the change in deadweight loss 
on the competing market due to the deviation of tax from marginal external cost. Of 
course, we generalize his findings by considering the cost of funds, the distortions on 
several other markets, and distributive issues.   
 
2.6. Comparison with existing guidelines 
Finally, we can compare the results with the more practical guides to cost-
benefit analysis. In three recent guides (European Commission (EC, 2002), European 
Investment Bank and European Commission (2006) and the World Bank (1998)) 
reference is made to the need to account, in addition to the direct benefits and costs of 
a project, to the marginal cost of public funds, distortions on secondary markets and 
equity impacts. However, in the specific numerical examples given for transport 
projects, effects are limited to direct impacts only. As an example, we refer to Table 
3.17 in EC (2002). There it is implicitly assumed that (i) two competing roads are 
perfect substitutes; (ii) no distortions exist on other markets
7; (iii) the marginal cost of 
funds is one, i.e. non-distortionary lump-sum taxes are available; and (iv) by 
implication, lump-sum taxes are used to ensure an equal marginal social utility of 
income (i.e., equity impacts are not relevant). A similar set of implicit assumptions 
are made within the rail investment case studies developed in European Investment 
Bank and European Commission (2006). The theory developed in this section 
                                                 
7 Admittedly, the example does measure costs in terms of shadow prices. By applying a conversion 
factor of around 0.5 to the share of unskilled labour costs within total investment costs, there is an 
indirect attempt to capture labour market imperfections. Our approach, by contrast, is a direct measure 
of this impact.  
  19indicates that this approach ignores several potentially important effects, due to 
distortions on other markets and the role of the marginal cost of funds. We illustrate 
these issues with a small numerical example in the next section.  
 
3. Towards operational cost-benefit rules 
 
In this section, we discuss some implementation problems that arise when 
trying to operationalize the theoretical results for realistic projects, using available 
data. Next we briefly discuss the problem of using extraneous estimates on time 
values in the model.  
In practice, an individual road or rail investment is unlikely to affect all 
individuals. This has several implications for making the cost-benefit rules 
operational. It is useful, therefore, to distinguish between individuals that are directly 
affected by the project and those that are not. The individuals directly affected are 
those that benefit directly from lower passenger transport prices and from lower prices 
for freight-intensive consumer goods. The set of all individuals N is therefore divided 
into the set  of other individuals not directly affected by the project and the set   
of those directly affected. Related to this, if the investment project is “small”, say 
affecting only one region or one city in a large country, we expect that the effect of a 
change in general taxes on local congestion  (the terms 








) will become very 
small. The reason is that the change in general taxes necessary to finance a local 
project becomes very small and, therefore, the behavioral effect on local users will be 
very small too.   
When a small project is financed by a nationwide tax instrument, the 
consequence of this argument is clear. For example, suppose a small local investment 
project is financed by a change in the lump-sum transfer for all individuals N. In that 
case, the congestion terms drop out of the definition of the marginal cost of public 












Similarly, in the case of financing via a reduction in the general labor tax on all 
individuals N, the cost of funds reads: 



















                     (25) 
Note the advantage of this latter expression: it can be approximated by estimates 
directly taken from the literature. Indeed, these estimates typically refer to national 
labour tax changes and they obviously ignore congestion effects (Kleven and Kreiner 
(2006)).  
Consider as, an example, the practical implementation of expression (23), 
assuming that a small project is financed by a reduction in the labour tax. Taking 
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All terms except the final one represent the welfare and demand effects on the small 
subset of individuals   that are directly affected by the project. The marginal cost of 
funds represents the investment cost financed by a general labour tax increase on the 
whole economy. This marginal cost of funds is approximated by (25); as suggested 
above, an estimate can be taken from available literature.  
d N
  A similar procedure can be followed for the case of financing by a lump-sum 
tax on all individuals N. However, when a project is entirely financed by an increase 
in transport taxes on the users of the transport capacity that is being extended by the 
investment, no such simplification can be applied. The reason is that in that case the 
financing of the investment does have non-negligible implications for congestion. The 
marginal cost of funds in this case takes into account these effects, see section 2.4 
above; it cannot be approximated by estimates available in the literature, but has to be 
  21endogenously determined within the model. We return to this issue in the numerical 
application below.      
  Finally, consider the issue of time values to be used when implementing the 
model. Standard practice in applied models is to take advantage of time values that 
are available in the empirical literature, and to introduce these exogenously into the 
model. This raises two issues. First, at the theoretical level, our model did not 
explicitly include the disutility of travel and labor time and, therefore, it implied time 
values equal to the net wage. As argued before, adapting the theory to allow for more 
flexibility in time values is conceptually simple, but complicates the derivations and 
goes at a loss of transparency. Moreover, doing so results in time values that are 
endogenously determined by the model. Second, the estimates found in the empirical 
literature are typically estimates of the value of an exogenous reduction in travel 
times; although related, this is a different concept than the value of time underlying 
the theoretical model which, at the consumer optimum, is independent of the activity 
in which time is spent. A compromise is necessary, therefore. This consists of (i) 
approximating the value of time by empirically estimated values, corrected for the 
disutility of time wasted in traffic and (ii) assuming that time values are not affected 
by the investment policy under consideration so that it can be treated as constant.          
 
4. Numerical example 
 
In order to apply the theory developed above, a simple numerical example of a 
marginal investment project has been developed. The “base case” (without project) is 
defined as an existing motorway with 2 lanes in each direction. The “project” is 
defined as an investment to widen the motorway from 2 lanes to 3 in each direction 
along a 20-kilometre section. In order to keep the example tractable, we make a 
number of restrictions to the general case developed above. We assume (i) a single 
transport good (i.e. passenger transport) and a single numeraire non-transport good; 
(ii) an explicitly separable, additive specification of the utility function
8, see below; 
(iii) an explicit linear specification for congestion, also discussed in detail below; (iv) 
a single representative consumer. Specifically, we assume there are n  identical 
individuals who are all directly affected by the project. Moreover, (v) we assume that 
                                                 
8 The additive separable utility function simplifies the analytical results because there are no income 
effects on transport demand and labor supply.    
  22the project is small relative to the whole economy. As argued in Section 3, this 
implies that the marginal cost of funds of financing the investment through the labour 
tax is not influenced by the investment project: the national labour tax changes 
induced by the project have a negligible impact on local congestion. Hence we can 
approximate the marginal cost of funds by exogenous estimates taken from the 
literature. By contrast, the marginal cost of funds when financing the investment by 
congestion tolls, cannot be assumed to be independent of the project: the changes in 
local congestion that result from financing the investment cannot be ignored. 
Consequently, in this case the marginal cost of funds is computed endogenously 
within the model.  
Finally, it turns out to be easier for the interpretation of the numerical results 
not to normalize wages and prices at one in the reference equilibrium. We denote 
wages and the resource cost of transport by w and r, respectively.   
 
4.1. Setup of the problem 
Specifically, let there be n  identical individuals affected directly by the 
project. Let the typical consumer maximize the following utility function subject to a 
budget and time constraint: 
2
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where  are, respectively, a numeraire non-transport good, passenger transport 
and leisure. We have normalized available time at one. Moreover, transport faces 
congestion; the time needed per unit of T, denoted 
,, CTl
γ , depends on the traffic level and 
on capacity. We assume a linear specification as function of the volume-capacity ratio 
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Here I is interpreted as the transport capacity available.  
Combining budget and time constraint yields:  
(1 ) (1 ) CP T t w l t wG ++ − = −+        
  where  is the generalized price of transport:  P
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The impact of travel time on transport demand is negative, so investment does 
increase demand for transport. Due to our additive utility formulation, leisure is not 
affected by a change in the transport time per unit; only the real wage plays a role. 
This means that a decrease in the transport time γ will affect the number of trips, and 
if this reduces overall transport time, the remaining time savings are used for labour 
supply. The sign of the effect of a decrease in unit transport time on labour supply is 
therefore ambiguous; it will be positive if the elasticity of transport with respect to 
travel time is greater than one. Finally, note that substitution of the demand function 
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For this particular setup, we derive the welfare effect of a marginal capacity  
increase financed by a reduction in the lump sum subsidy  (or by an increase in the  
labour tax 
G
L τ ). This implies that all individuals in the economy contribute to the 
financing of the project. Specifically, we show in Appendix 3 that the equivalent of 
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The first term on the right hand side of (26) is the direct effect at constant transport 
demand. The second term is the relevant marginal cost of funds of financing by G (or 
L τ ), levied on the whole economy. The third term captures the effect of transport 
investment on labor tax revenues paid by those directly affected by the investment 
project, and the final term captures the product of the change in the number of trips of 
those directly affected and the difference between the transport tax revenue (weighted 
by the MCF) and the marginal external cost.   
 
4.2.Data 
The following typical investment costs are assumed (all cost figures relate to 
flat terrain in Europe, excluding VAT (see Conseil général des ponts et chausses, 
2006)): 
•  7 m EUR/km for 2 lanes (i.e. the base case); 
•  10 m EUR/km for 3 lanes. 
This implies near constant-returns-to-scale in lane expansion. Given an asset life of 30 
years and a discount rate of 5%, the annuitized value of investment without the 
project (i.e. for 2-lanes in each direction only) is equal to 9.1 m EUR per year.  
The capacity of the motorway is assumed to be 2,000 vehicles per lane per 
hour per direction. Morning peak-period transport demand in the base case is assumed 
equal to capacity for 3 hours i.e.12,000 vehicles. All benefits are assumed to occur 
during the peak period, with speed at capacity equal to 30 kph, compared with a free-
flow speed of 130 kph.  
  Finally, assumptions made for all other data are collected in Table 1.   
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N  12,000 In  text 
Demand  C  1 Normalised 
  T  1  Single morning commute 
  L  – time endowment  12 See  text 
  L – labour supply   5  See text 
Taxes  τ  – tax rate on transport  0.2  
  t – tax on labour  0.3  See text 
Budget 
constraint 
r – gross vehicle operating 
resource cost/km 
0.3  De Borger and Proost 
(2001) 
  w – gross wage rate in 
EUR/hour 
20  Implies net of tax wage 
(or value of time) equal 
to 15 EUR/hr (De Borger 
and Proost, 2001) 
Table 1: parameter assumptions 
 
4.3.Calibration 
The model has five unknowns. The transport unknowns –   – have been 
calibrated to ensure a generalized price elasticity of demand of -0.6, equivalent to a 
money elasticity of demand equal to -.3 (Parry and Bento, 2001). The leisure 
unknowns –  – have been calibrated to ensure an elasticity of labour supply with 
respect to net-of-tax wage of 0.3 (Parry and Bento, 2001). In addition, the parameters 
are selected to ensure reasonable shares of money expenditures on transport (8% - 
with the remainder on the numeraire good) and time shares (53% on labour supply, 
42% on leisure; 6% transport). See, for example, Mayeres and Proost (1997) for 
detailed analysis of expenditure shares. 
12 , aa
12 , bb
For the congestion function (i.e. unknown m), applying the assumptions made 
on base case speed and flow, the congestion function can be solved for m. In order to 
test the reasonableness of this specification, it is insightful to compute the base case 
marginal elasticity of travel time with respect to capacity. This equals -0.6, i.e., a ten 
  26percent increase in investment reduces average travel time by 6%. This seems 
reasonable – adding a third lane broadly equals a 30% in annuitised capacity cost and 
would result in an approximately 20% increase in average peak-period speed (at new 
traffic levels), i.e., from 30 kph to 36kph. 
 
4.4. Results 
For a discrete investment, it is possible to compute the difference in indirect 
utility from the project (net of the base case). However, in order to illustrate the 
continuous case developed above, we report results under a notional 1 euro marginal 
investment.  
Table 2 shows the central results of the model. We assume that the project is 
financed via a labour tax on the whole economy. Hence, following the justification in 
section 3 above, we assume an exogenous marginal cost of public funds equal to 1.5. 
We find that a one euro investment in capacity leads to a net social welfare gain of 
2.58 euro. This gain can be divided into the four components of equation (26). Line 1 
in Table 2 shows that the direct benefit from time savings to those directly affected by 
the project equals 3.45, while the cost, adjusted for the marginal cost of public funds 
obviously equals 1.50 (see Line 2). In addition, the transport investment boosts taxed 
labour market supply of those directly affected by the investment, this is due to our 
functional forms where transport time savings result in higher labour supply only.  
This provides an additional benefit of 1.16 euros (see Line 3). Finally, Line 4 shows 
that the investment also boosts under-taxed transport demand for those directly 
affected, and this reduces welfare by 0.54 euro. Taking all impacts into account, the 
total gain in welfare equals 2.58 euros.  
 
Table 2: Central Result 
 
1 Direct  benefit  3.45 
2 Direct  cost  -1.50 
3  Labour market   1.16 
4  Transport market   -0.54 
    
WELFARE  all impacts: 1-4  2.58 
 
 
  27In Table 3 we show how the results vary according to other assumptions on 
the type of taxes that are used to finance the investment. This is done via changes in 
the marginal cost of funds MCF. In three cases, following the justification in Section 
3, different exogenous values for MCF have been assumed, reflecting the fact that 
taxes are imposed on the whole economy and, hence, have negligible effects on local 
congestion: (i) in the first column, results are shown for financing via a lump sum tax. 
Given the specification of utility and the absence of income effects, our example then 
implies that the MCF=1; (ii) in the last two columns, results are given for two 
different exogenous values for the labour tax: we use as before 1.5 in the central case, 
and also consider a higher cost of funds equal to 2.0. Finally, we also present results 
for the case where the investment is financed by raising the transport tax (τ ) on users 
of the infrastructure, As argued before, in this case the MCF has to be determined 
endogenously by the model; for the base case calibration, we find a MCF equal to 
1.12. This is not inconsistent with other estimates in the literature (e.g. Mayeres and 
Proost, 1997). The results under this last financing instrument are shown in the second 
column. All calculations assume an initial transport tax  0.2 τ =  and an elasticity of 
labour supply with respect to travel time (denoted e) equal to -0.07. We find that the 
larger the MCF, the smaller the overall welfare gain from the project: MCF=2 causes 
the total welfare gain to drop to 2.53. 
 
Table 3: Influence of MCF  
 
MCF (tau=0.2; e = -0.07) 
LUMP 
SUM  TOLL LAB  LAB  HI 
   MCF=1  MCF=1.12  MCF=1.5  MCF = 2 
1 Direct  benefit  3.45  3.45  3.45  3.45 
2 Direct  cost  -1.00  -1.12  -1.50  -2.00 
3  Labour market   0.77  0.87  1.16  1.55 
4  Transport market   -0.60  -0.58  -0.54  -0.48 
           
WELFARE  all impacts: 1-4  2.63  2.62  2.58  2.53 
 simple:  1+2  2.45  2.33  1.95  1.45 
  transport only: 1,2+4  1.86  1.75  1.42  0.98 
 
 
Table 3 further provides an interesting comparison point for different types of 
transport models. In many practical cases, project evaluation is done on the basis of a 
standard transport model which does not consider MCF or labour market impacts. The 
  28impact of ignoring the different elements of equation (26) is shown in the last two 
rows of Table 3. Assume the central result is correct. A simple cost-benefit analysis 
may (implicitly) assume in the case of labour taxes a MCF=1 – rather than 1.5 - and 
add direct impacts only. Table 3 shows this approach (marked ’simple’) would 
measure the net benefit at 2.45 – underestimating the real impact by around 5%.  A 
more sophisticated model, taking into account congestion impacts, may also measure 
the impact on the distortion on the transport market – i.e. line 4. In this case, shown as 
‘transport only’, the net social impact would be measured as 1.86, as the investment 
generates additional congestion. However, this underestimates the true benefit of the 
investment, equal to 2.58, by nearly 30%. Of course, this result depends crucially on 
the labour market response of a transport investment. In fact, one might suspect that 
this response is on the high side in our model. First, separable utility implies that 
leisure does not increase in response to changes in transport time. Second, the labour 
market response is weighted by the MCF. At the other extreme, if the labour supply 
response were zero, then the “transport only” approach is the right approximation.     
Table 4 shows the impact of different assumptions with respect to existing 
tolls on the project whose capacity is being extended. The central case, as usual, is 
shown in the middle column. Recall that, in this case, passenger transport is 
underpriced: passengers pay taxes, measured in public revenue terms, that are 
significantly under marginal external costs (MEC). In the model, setting a toll equal to 
around eighty percent of resource costs (τ  =0.8) approximately equals the MEC. At 
this level of toll, the net benefits of the investments are much higher: 2.99 rather than 
2.58. This is consistent with results of the literature on investment with imperfect 
tolling (e.g. Small, 1992).  
 
Table 4: Influence of toll 
 
tau (MCF = 1.5; e = -0.07)     
    tau = 0.1  tau = 0.2  tau = 0.8 
1 Direct  benefit  3.45  3.45  3.45 
2 Direct  cost  -1.50  -1.50  -1.50 
3  Labour market   1.18  1.16  1.04 
4  Transport market   -0.62  -0.54  0.00 
         
WELFARE  all impacts: 1-4  2.52  2.58  2.99 
 simple:  1+2  1.95  1.95  1.95 
  transport only: 1,2+4  1.34  1.42  1.96 
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Finally, the impact of the investment on ameliorating pre-existing labour 
market distortions depends to a large degree on the elasticity of labour supply with 
respect to travel time (denoted e). In the central case, e was approximately -0.07. 
Table 5 shows the sensitivity of the overall results to this assumption. The more 
sensitive labour supply is to travel time, the greater the additional benefit of the 
investment. Indeed, in this example, as the first column shows, if labour supply is 
wholly inelastic, the net benefit of the project is modest, given the cost of public funds 
and the magnitude of the pre-existing distortion on the transport market. 
 
 
Table 5: Influence of labour response 
 
e (MCF = 1.5; tau = 0.2)     
    e = 0  e = -0.07  E = -0.1 
1 Direct  benefit  3.45 3.45 3.45 
2 Direct  cost  -1.50 -1.50 -1.50 
3  Labour market   0.00 1.16 1.96 
4  Transport market   -1.12 -0.54 -0.13 
        
WELFARE  all impacts: 1-4  0.83 2.58 3.78 
 simple:  1+2  1.95 1.95 1.95 
  transport only: 1,2+4  0.83 1.42 1.82 
 
 
4.5. Lessons from the numerical example 
The numerical model provides a simple application of the general theory 
developed above. The different components of the welfare impact of a marginal 
investment in a motorway network are illustrated under a variety of plausible 
parameter values. 
In general terms, the simple model suggests that labour market impacts may 
play an important role in determining the net benefits of transport investment. In our 
simple model, the investment serves to boost labour supply. In reality this will depend 
on the precise project. This seems plausible for motorways feeding employment 
centres. In theory, investment may equally serve to reduce labour supply, as the 





In this paper we embedded cost-benefit analysis of a transport investment in a 
general equilibrium framework that takes into account distortions on all markets, as 
well as the distributional effects of both the infrastructure improvement and of the 
way it is financed. We first developed a simple theoretical general equilibrium model 
to explore the impact of a small budgetary-neutral investment in transport 
infrastructure in a second-best setting, where other markets in the economy are 
distorted by taxes or external costs.  The model incorporates different transport modes 
that are used both for intermediate inputs (freight) and for final consumption 
(passenger travel). We derived and interpreted a general but quite intuitive operational 
expression for the net economic benefit of an investment that takes into account the 
way the investment is financed. Next we illustrate the application of the methodology 
with a few numerical examples.  
Conclusions are easily summarized. First, both the theoretical model and the 
numerical application suggest that only capturing direct costs and benefits of an 
investment, and hence ignoring the distortions on labor and transport markets, may 
lead to very misleading cost-benefit outcomes. Second, the numerical example 
illustrated the relevance of the indirect effects. In the example, the investment serves 
to raise labour supply, affecting substantially the net benefits of the project. Although 
this seems plausible for motorways feeding employment centres, it remains an 
empirical matter which needs to be established in the context of any particular project.   
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Appendices:  
 
1. The welfare effect of a rail investment financed by reducing the transfer G  
  
The welfare effect of a time-reducing rail investment is given by: 
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is the welfare cost of time losses in rail transport. The term   (the welfare cost of 









considered in more detail below.  
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From the government budget constraint we derive the increase in the lump-
sum tax needed to finance a small increase in rail investment:  























                    
Substitution and using the cost of funds defined above (see (17)), we have: 
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This expression has a nice interpretation. The welfare effect consists of three terms. 
The first one is the direct benefit of faster rail service for consumers. The second term 
captures the extra benefit for consumers due to reductions in road congestion induced 
by rail investment: faster rail service reduces the generalized price of rail relative to 
road and reduces road demand; this reduces congestion. The third term measures the 
welfare implications of financing the investment: apart from the direct cost, the 
investment induces revenue changes. All budgetary implications are measured at the 
cost of funds.    
  Further interpretation can be obtained as follows. First, rewrite the last 
expression as: 
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Now observe that the effect of rail investment on road congestion is given by (see 
(4)):  
  
11 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1
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The rail investment reduces travel time by rail; this affects commuting and non-
commuting passenger road transport as well as freight road transport; hence, 
congestion on the road rises (see the first term). However, more congestion reduces 
road transport demand, generating feedbacks, see the second term. Substituting this 
final expression for the term associated with the  , we find:  i A
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  36Finally, note that the effects of time changes in road and rail transport on revenues are 
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Substitute these last two equations and use the definitions of marginal external 
congestion costs given before: 
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2. The welfare effect of investment in roads financed by raising the tax on labor 
  Consider the welfare change due to investing an extra euro in road capacity, 
financing the investment by raising the labor tax. This welfare effect can be written 
as: 
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  37It consists of the direct welfare effect of the investment, independent of financing plus 
the induced effects due to financing. Differentiating the welfare function, using Roy’s 
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Note that the welfare effect of a labor tax change consists of the weighted effect on 
employment plus the indirect effects via congestion. Using these results and 
rearranging gives: 
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  From the government budget constraint we derive the increase in the labor tax 
needed to finance a small increase in road investment. We find: 
























                    































Using the last two expressions we can rewrite the welfare effects of investment: 





















⎡ ⎤⎡ ∂ ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎢ =− − − ⎜⎟⎢⎥ ∂ ⎝⎠
⎥
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎣⎦ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣
∑
⎦
            
  Interestingly, this only differs from the expression for the welfare effects of 
road investment financed by a reduction in the transfer by the fact that the marginal 
cost of funds differs (compare with expression (18)). Going through the same 
procedures as before (i.e., working out the revenue effects and the congestion term) 
we finally get:   
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Again, this is identical to what we had before, except for the use of a different 
marginal cost of funds.  
 
 
3. Structure of the numerical example 
There are n identical individuals. Let the typical consumer maximize utility 
subject to a budget and time constraint: 
2
12 1 2 ,,
11
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      ( A 2 )  
where  are, respectively, a numeraire non-transport good, passenger transport 
and leisure. We have normalized available time at one. Moreover, transport faces 
congestion; the time needed per unit of T, denoted 
,, CTl
γ , depends on the traffic level and 
on capacity. We assume, in line with the bottleneck model, a linear specification as 







γ == +       ( A 3 )  
Here I is interpreted as the annuitized transport investment.  
Combining budget and time constraint yields:  
(1 ) (1 ) CP T t w l t wG ++ − = −+      ( A 4 )  
  where  is the generalized price of transport:  P
   (1 ) (1 ) Pr w t τ γ =+ +−     ( A 5 )  
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Substitution of (A4) and (A6) in (A1) gives indirect utility. It can be written as: 
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Now consider the welfare effect of a budgetary neutral increase in capacity 
investment I , where the investment increase is financed by adjusting the tax on labor: 
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Finally, the labor tax change needed to finance the extra investment is derived from 
the government budget constraint: 
twL rT G I τ += +        ( A 1 1 )  
Reformulating and using the time constraint of the consumer in (A2) yields the 
implicit function  
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Define the marginal cost of funds of raising extra tax revenues by raising the 





=                       (A14) 
Note an analguous expression can be defined for the marginal cost of alternate tax 
instruments, including the congestion toll. Combining (A13)-(A14) gives: 
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Next, substitute (A9) and (A15) into the definition of the total welfare effect (A8), and 
use (A13). We find: 
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and substitute into (A16): 
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(A17) 
 
This is the perfect analogy to expression (19) in the theory section, given that we only 
have transport and labor markets and no distribution. The term MCF is here 
interpreted for a labour tax – but note it can equally refer to an alternate financing 
instrument.  
Finally, to get the equivalent of (21) in the theoretical section, we use the 
definition of the time cost per travel time given in (A3) to get: 
2
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      (A18) 
Substitute in the first term on the right hand side of (A17), use the definition of the 
marginal external cost: 
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          ( A 2 0 )  
The first term of (A20) is the direct effect at constant transport demand (see 
(A18)), the second term is the marginal cost of funds, the third term captures the 
effect of investment on labor tax revenues, and the final term captures the impact on 
transport tax revenues corrected for marginal external costs. Expression (A20) is the 
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Moreover, we have 
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